Biometrics are widely used for authentication in several domains, services and applications. However, only very few systems succeed in e ectively combining highly secure user authentication with an adequate privacy protection of the biometric templates, due to the di culty associated with jointly providing good authentication performance, unlinkability and irreversibility to biometric templates.
INTRODUCTION
Biometrics is a way to measure personal features, having the potential to authenticate individuals with a high degree of assurance while o ering convenience to the user. Consequently, the use of automated biometric-based frameworks has become increasingly popular in both governmental and commercial services for user authentication. However, the use of biometrics also poses serious threats both to privacy and security of the users. It was shown by Pagnin et al. [25] that leakage of biometric data in a remote se ing is hard to avoid. Leakage of biometric data may lead to the disclosure of personal information, e.g., demographics (for instance age, as shown by Han et al. [14] ) or medical information (for instance as shown by Bolling [8] and Penrose [22] for the case of iris and ngerprint pa erns, respectively). Furthermore, the leaked biometric data may be used to create spoofed biometric samples, thus thwarting the secure use of biometrics for authentication. ese di culties have slowed down the adoption of biometrics in remote authentication schemes, where the risks of information leakage are high.
e main goal of designing a biometric protection scheme is to provide irreversibility and unlinkability, as de ned in the ISO/IEC 24745:2011 standard [16] . Irreversibility means that it should be computationally hard to reconstruct the original biometric template from the stored reference data, i.e., the protected biometric template, while it should be easy to generate the protected biometric template. Unlinkability means that di erent versions of protected biometric templates can be generated based on the same biometric data (renewability), while protected biometric templates should not allow cross-matching (diversity).
In literature, several approaches were proposed for protecting biometric data, including the use of biometric template protection schemes, such as those based on fuzzy extractors [12] , or through the use of homomorphic encryption schemes. However, most of the proposed biometric template protection schemes su er from degradation of veri cation performance, partial reversibility or linkability. Recently, research moved towards a new direction, taking the wider context of authentication into account and leverage multifactor user authentication. In multi-factor user authentication, the user is veri ed by a combination of di erent authentication factors that belong to one of the following categories: (a) possession factor, e.g., a token stored on the user's mobile phone; (b) knowledge factor, e.g., a PIN or password that the user remembers; and (c) inherent factor, e.g., a biometric a ribute. is new direction does not only result in increased security, since the user has to provide more than one type of authentication evidence, but it can also be used for improving the privacy protection of biometric data.
In this work, we introduce the rst sound procedure to decouple the biometrics from their binary representation before using biometric protection schemes. Furthermore, we build further on the latest direction in biometric protection research by proposing a privacy-preserving and secure two-factor authentication protocol for remote scenarios.
Related Work
Recently, biometric protection research is moving into the direction of combing biometrics with other (knowledge-based or possessionbased) authentication factors. Given the shear amount of related work, we limit ourselves to the most relevant related works.
Zheng [32] , Zhu [33] and Wua et al. [31] presented di erent approaches that rely on the encryption of the biometric template. However, these schemes need to decrypt the biometric template, which is solely protected by means of the encryption, and do not deal with unlinkability of template.
Syta et al. [29] proposed a combination of two factors, but the privacy of biometrics would be disclosed if the token is obtained by the authentication server. Fan et al. [13] designed a privacypreserving scheme using three-factor authentication. However, biometric unlinkability is not achieved if the token is disclosed. Meenakshi and Padmavathi [23] suggested a password-hardened fuzzy vault. e password is directly combined with the biometric binary representation and a uniform distribution of the samples is assumed in order to avoid any information disclosure. Nevertheless, the disclosure of the password would expose the biometrics, and renewability is only achievable by continuously changing the user's password, which is not a real biometric renewability. More recently, Abidin et al. [1, 2, 4] proposed privacy-preserving biometric authentication protocols secure against malicious (as opposed to semi-honest) adversaries. ese protocols also use a second authentication factor which is used to enhance the privacy of biometric templates, but do not consider revocability and/or renewability of biometric templates.
Abidin et al. [3] presented a modi cation of an earlier protocol presented by Bringer et al. [9] , which relies on homomorphic encryption. In their modi ed version, the authors improve the protocol to achieve security against malicious but not colluding insider adversaries, utilising additional secret keys. As in the original protocol, the Abidin et al. protocol also stores the reference biometric templates in the clear. Although this approach is secure against malicious adversaries, it comes with more complexity and requires the storage of additional cryptographic keys, and it only protects the link between biometric data and their original owners.
BioHash [17] , introduced by Andrew Teoh Beng et al., was a rst a empt at decoupling the biometric representation from the original biometric sample. Even though this feature transformation approach asymptotically preserves distances between genuine and impostor biometric samples in the original and transformed domains, the statistical assumptions on the biometric sources (intraclass and inter-class sca er matrices must be known) and the size of the obtained metadata can thwart its practical adoption. Moreover, the use of the stored information (the transformed template) and the metadata (can be stored locally) allows for reconstruction of the biometric representation, posing a serious threat to privacy and security.
Monrose et al. [24] presented an approach for generating longterm secret keys from passwords and keystroke dynamics. is approach is similar to ours in the sense that it encrypts a metadata table with the password. e approach proposed by Monrose et al. only takes into account the most reliable biometric features provide biometric-dependent information for reconstructing the secret key and it is not taking advantage of the information provided by features with low reliability, which makes the system not useful when the biometric trait exclusively provides a huge number of unreliable feature. e scheme is adaptive in the sense that the changes in the reliability of the features are smoothly taken into account. However, in order to provide the same secret key, all the reliable features have to agree, which results in a trade-o between a high entropy of the secret key and a low false rejection rate. Moreover, the stored metadata related to non-reliable features contains information that can be used to reconstruct the secret key even without access to an original biometric sample.
Contributions
We propose a procedure that decouples the original biometric samples from their binary representation and use this result to construct a new biometric protection method for two-factor authentication in remote se ings. Furthermore, the security and privacy properties of the resulting method are formally analysed. Concretely, our contributions are:
• In Sect. 2, we present our adversarial model and security de nitions. We assume malicious external adversaries for security and even allow for an malicious Service Provider (the party where the user authenticates to) for privacy. is adversarial model is stronger than the ones commonly used in related work, i.e. honest-but-curious.
• Our proposed biometric decoupling procedure is presented in Sect. 3, with a concrete example for the case of IrisCodes. e choice of iris biometrics for a mobile user authentication application is motivated by the existence of several commercial and academic systems using this modality (e.g., Wang and Liu [30] ) and the camera as a biometric capture device being generally and openly available. e la er in contrast with other commonly used mobile biometrics such as ngerprints, where the biometric capture behaviour is xed, and its security usually relies on industrial secrecy [5, 26] . We also discuss the application of our biometric decoupling procedure to other biometric modalities in Sect. 3.2, including behavioural and dynamic biometrics. e proposed decoupling procedure provides increased reliability of the binary features by using userspeci c information, thus improving security and biometric authentication performance. It also enables us to choose an arbitrary binary representation for the biometrics, thus facilitating unlinkability.
• e feasibility of the proposed decoupling procedure in the context of remote authentication is shown in Sect. 4, by presenting a protocol for secure and privacy-preserving remote user authentication, based on the biometric treat and a second factor based on either knowledge or possession. e metadata, generated by the biometric decoupling procedure, is encrypted using a cryptographic key, which is derived from an independent authentication factor to avoid linkability between metadata. It should also be noted that we do not rely on homomorphic encryption (such as, e.g., [9] and [3] ), resulting in reduced complexity.
• In Sect. 5, we show that the proposed protocol is secure against malicious external adversaries and that the overall construction provides privacy both against malicious Service Provider and external adversaries.
BACKGROUND
Cryptographic schemes relies on keys, which are chosen uniformly at random and then remain xed. is means that, in order to use biometrics as keys for cryptographic primitives, one rst needs to transform these inherently noisy sources into a stable string which is indistinguishable from a random distribution. A common approach for doing this is using fuzzy extractors. A fuzzy extractor is a construction that allows to characterise noisy information sources with xed random strings. Juels [18] presented a practical construction, which is based on the use of Error Correcting Codes, PseudoRandom Generators and Hash functions. A formal de nition can be found in [12] . In our case, we use a binary Error Correcting Code ECC (n, k, t ) ⊂ {0, 1} n , where n is the length of the codewords, k is the length of messages, k < n, and t is the number of errors that can be corrected in the received codewords. e two associated functions are denoted as ECC encode and ECC decode .
For the proposed protocol we make use of a secure key derivation function (KDF) to derive cryptographic keys using a secret input data, e.g., a password, with su cient min-entropy. In particular, we use a KDF to generate keys for an IND-CPA-secure symmetric encryption and a strongly-unforgeable digital signature scheme. We denote by ENC and DEC the symmetric key encryption and decryption algorithms, and by SIGN and VER the public key digital signature signing and veri cation algorithms, respectively.
De nition 2.1 (Adapted from [21]).
A key derivation function is said to be secure with respect to a source of input with a minentropy greater than or equal to λ if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) a acker A can distinguish its output from a random output of equal length, except with a non-negligible probability negl(λ), where negl is a negligible function.
Adversarial model
We consider two types of adversaries: adversaries that aim to break security and those that aim to break privacy. We assume that the adversary is in full control of all communication between Service Providers (SP) and user devices (D) and can hence eavesdrop, modify, re-order, replay, inject and drop messages at will. We assume that the user and the user's device are fully trusted, i.e., users abide by the protocol speci cations when authenticating as themselves and trust their own device only in the sense that the device is not compromised.
e security adversary will try to impersonate an uncompromized user to SP potentially having access, in addition to all protocol transcripts, to all available input of parties involved with the exception of at least one of the authentication factors of the legitimate user it is trying to impersonate.
De nition 2.2 (Security)
. Π = (Enroll, Authenticate) is a secure multi-factor authentication system if no PPT adversary A can successfully authenticate itself to the veri er as the legitimate user it impersonates, even when given all protocol transcripts and all inputs of the veri er and all provers with the exception of at least one authentication factor of the user it tries to impersonate.
e privacy adversary will try to link users across enrollments (possibly at di erent possibly colluding service providers) for which we only consider the linkage of information that is derived from the user's biometric template Q as this cannot (easily) be changed (as opposed to other knowledge-based and possession-based authentication factors). e adversary provides two biometric templates, Q 0 and Q 1 , from which one will be used for enrolling user U, a er which the adversary can authenticate poly-many times as this user using any input as the other authentication factor(s). We do not consider privacy in the sense that multiple authentication a empts by the same user (for the same enrollment) might be linked.
De nition 2.3 (Privacy).
For Π = (Enroll, Authenticate) as before, consider the following game played between a PPT adversary A and a challenger:
α the storage at the veri er and * meaning 1 or more
We de ne the adversary's advantage in this game as
, for all PPT adversary A.
DECOUPLING BIOMETRIC REPRESENTATIONS
e fuzzy commitment approach does not provide any mechanism for guaranteeing unlinkability of the protected templates. It is easy to determine that two templates have been generated using the same biometric sample, as shown by Simoens et al. in [27] , therefore this cryptosystem does not provide unlinkability when the secret (the binary biometric representation) must remain the same.
Furthermore, the number and robustness of biometric features are not usually appropriate for being protected using a fuzzy commitment scheme, and this is a critical issue. On one hand, the fuzzy commitment scheme needs that the number of protected bits coincides with the length of the used error correcting code. And on the other hand, the reliability of these bits (the probability to remain unchanged among di erent biometric samples from the same individual) determines the required error correcting capability of the code: the higher this reliability, the lower the required error correcting capability, and the higher the message length, or equivalently the security parameter of the fuzzy commitment scheme.
We propose to decouple the binary representation from the biometric data, producing a target binary representation with increased robustness from the biometric features, thus circumventing these problems in the fuzzy commitment. e target binary representation can be chosen during the enrollment stage, making possible that the nal binary string is completely independent from the biometric data, thus guaranteeing unlinkability between protected templates generated from the same biometric features.
is is achieved by using two intermediate functions. e rst one takes as inputs the biometric enrollment samples and the desired random binary representation, and returns a set BM of binarization metadata as output, BM = f (Q E , b) .
is is the binarization metadata extractor function, and must be used during the enrollment phase. e second function takes as inputs the biometric veri cation samples and the set of binarization metadata produced by the rst function. Its output is the binary representation of the veri cation biometrics.
is
It is important to underline that the binarization metadata establishes a relationship between the biometric samples and the binary representation, therefore this binarization metadata have to be protected in order to avoid a leak of information. As a remark, in this work we do not present a general approach for computing these functions, since the paper is focused on the possibilities that such an approach o ers for designing authentication protocols providing both the highest security and privacy protection. However, in the next section an example of these two functions for the IrisCode case is illustrated, and the application of this approach to other biometric modalities is then discussed. 3.1.1 Feature extraction. In the speci c example of iris, bits conforming the Daugman's IrisCode [10] encode the phase of complex Gabor wavelets' responses as a vector w = [w 1 , ..., w N ] t . Biometric measurements can be wri en before the binary encoding step as a vector of phase measurements:
Speci c Case: IrisCode
where φ i = arctan ( (w i )/ (w i )), i ∈ {1, ..., N }. Two bits are extracted from each phase value, as portrayed in Fig. 1 , and formally de ned by the following IrisCode coding function,
3.1.2 Proposed randomized binarization process. e bit values b i can be decoupled from the corresponding biometric phase measurement φ i by using shi ed versions ϕ i = φ i +θ i in the binarization in Eq. 3.1.1, where θ i are phase shi terms. We could simply choose these phase shi terms for each phase measurement as:
with k i ∈ {0, . . . , 3}, obtaining a binarization metadata BM = [θ 1 , . . . , θ N ] completely independent from the original biometric representation Q. However, phase measurements near the decision thresholds will provide low reliability, i.e., new biometric samples from the same individual could produce di erent bits. A further improvement can be done for increasing the reliability (resilience to change) of the bits in the resulting template, making the phase ϕ i = φ i + θ i to be centred in its corresponding quadrant, i.e.
, with k i ∈ {0, . . . , 3} and j ∈ Z. Let us de ne j φ i = minarg j ∈Z j (π /2) + π /4 − φ i . en, the phase shi s producing robust binary features can be de ned as:
with k i chosen from the set {0, . . . , 3}. Given a binary representation for the i-th phase term
we remind that it holds the IrisCode binarization, i.e. b i = IC (ϕ i ) = IC (φ i + θ i ). erefore, the k i indexes can be computed as k i = k ∈ {0, . . . , 3} | b i = IC (φ i + θ i ) , with θ i computed using Eq. 1, or Eq. 2 for increased binary reliability.
e complete metadata extractor function is de ned as the randomised function BM = f (Q, b) = [θ 1 , ..., θ N ] t , where θ i is computed using Eq. 1, or alternatively Eq. 2. For the binarization of a biometric phase measurement Q = [φ 1 , . . . , φ N ], the phase shi s stored in BM are applied to Q . is is done by the binarization function, de ned as
It can be checked that (Q, f (Q, b)) = b, in both cases when Eq. 1 or Eq. 2 are used for calculating the phase shi terms. e phase shi s obtained using this approach carry information about the original representation, since mod {θ i , π /2} is the distance of the original phase measurement to the closest phase bin centre. However, this metadata does not carry information about the original bin, and therefore it does not pose any risk to security, keeping a 2-bit uncertainty on the corresponding biometric phase. As long as these metadata are encrypted, the privacy risk posed by the distances to phase bin centre can be assumed for the sake of both (a) improved feature reliability, and thus increased security parameter in the biometric template protection scheme and improved biometric authentication performance, and (b) protected template unlinkability.
Further increasing robustness. e procedure described in the previous section can be modi ed to also reduce the binary representation length n and further improve binary features reliability. is length must not depend on the number of biometric features N . Instead, n can be imposed by other criterion, such as available code lengths when using a fuzzy commitment scheme. In the previously explained procedure, n = 2N . We present here how to proceed for n < 2N . Some biometric features will be contributing to the same couple of bits, thus increasing the reliability of these bits. is is specially useful in the case of iris, where occlusions of large parts of the iris pa ern is a very usual situation.
Let us de ne the set of biometric features contributing to a given couple of bits b i as F i = {φ i 1 , . . . , φ i |Fi | }, with i j ∈ {1, . . . , N }, and j ∈ {1, . . . , |F i |}. en, all the corresponding phase shi s are calculated using the same target bit values b i , i.e.
and θ i j is calculated using Eq. 1 or Eq. 2 alternatively.
e sets describing which phase measurements contribute to each bit should be mutually exclusive to avoid undesired correlations between bits, and become part of the binarization metadata:
Describing an exact procedure for partitioning the phase measurements into these sets in an optimal way is out of the scope of this paper, though we provide here an intuition. is partition must be aimed at minimising the mean number of bit errors in the veri cation phase for genuine users. erefore, it must take into account the following factors:
• Inter-session user-dependent distribution of the biometric features. is will allow for designing partitions where the resultant bits are equally reliable. • Feature occlusion model, to distribute the occluded features in an uniform way through all the bits.
In the case of the binarization function, it relies on the available biometric measurements in each set. If the user-dependent distribution model assumes the same inter-session noise distribution and independence between the phase features, this function can simply be the arithmetic mean.
Application to other biometric modalities
e derivation of the parameterised binarization and metadata extractor uncoupling functions depends on the nature of the biometric features. Similar derivations to the one presented in the previous section could be done for other biometric modalities, as long as biometric features are presented in a xed-length vectorial form. In general, the proposed approach can be applied to any modality where a fuzzy extractor can be derived, with the advantage that user-speci c information can be easily integrated in the uncoupling process, as shown in the iris case, for increasing biometric authentication performance.
is covers most of the biometric modalities:
(1) Face recognition, where textural descriptors and eigenspace representations are usually xed-length. Examples of the successful application of fuzzy extraction schemes to face biometrics can be found for instance in [19] and [28] .
(2) Speaker recognition, where the state-of-the-art i-vector representation presented by Dehak et al. in [11] is also a xed-length vector representation. Feasibility of fuzzy extraction for the speech modality has been shown by Billeb et al. in [7] . (3) Dynamic biometrics, such as online signature recognition, where xed-length representations can be obtained using eigen-model representations and successfully used for building fuzzy extractors, as shown by Argones Rúa et al. in [6] . Other xed length descriptions for dynamic biometrics, such as the global features presented by Ibrahim et al. in [15] for online signature, or the ones used by Monrose et al. in [24] for keystroke dynamics, are also well suited. (4) Textural-based ngerprint recognition, such as the scheme presented by Khalil et al. in [20] .
USER AUTHENTICATION
We now present our two-factor secure and privacy-preserving user authentication system, consisting of an enrollment and an authentication protocol. One factor is the biometric data, from which we extract an uncoupled random binary representation as explained in the previous section. e second factor is used to protect the binarization metadata. e random biometric binary representation is transformed into a signing key sk with a corresponding veri cation key pk. Authentication is done by signing a challenge from the veri er. Intuitively, our authentication system is secure because in order to impersonate a legitimate user, an a acker needs to correctly sign the challenge, where the signing key is protected by both factors. Authentication takes place between a user through his or her device and a service provider. e device mainly acts as a proxy for the user, being able to do the necessary computations and se ing up communication with the service provider. e protocols are designed such that no storage is required on the device. is has two major bene ts: (1) users can use any trusted device to authenticate to the service provider, and (2) losing the device does not lead to security or privacy issues as there is no secret information stored. On the downside, it is generally acknowledged that users tend to choose passwords with low min-entropy. is has an impact on the maximal achievable security and privacy, where security can be maintained at the same level as long as the adversary has no access to the biometric data of the user, the privacy-preserving properties of the system go down to the min-entropy of the password. Another reason for opting for a possession-based second factor is user convenience as the user is not required to type the password. For this reason, we leave both options open to which second authentication factor to use.
Enrollment Protocol
e enrollment protocol is illustrated in Fig. 2 and involves the following:
• e device asks the user to provide a (unique) username for the service provider and in a second phase a set of biometric samples together with a second authentication factor. In case of a possession-based second authentication factor, this could be generated by the device itself.
Rand. message: m ∈ R {0, 1} λ Secret key: sk = KDF(m, s i ) Public key: pk = gen-pk(sk) ECC-encode: c = ECC encode (m)
Binarization metadata: • e service provider supplies the device with a unique salt for the given username. is salt will be used for deriving both the symmetric key (when having a knowledge-based second authentication factor) and the signing key, ensuring that there is su cient randomness as input for the key derivation function for both keys. It also ensures that if the database of the server gets compromised, one cannot e ciently precompute the symmetric keys derived from the most frequently used passwords.
• e device generates a random message that serves as input to the KDF for generating the signing key and corresponding public veri cation key. To ensure that one can later-on recover this message from the randomised binary representation, it is rst encoded with an error correcting code.
• e binarization metadata is generated and protected by a symmetric key encryption scheme to ensure the privacy of the user.
• e device sends the public key and the encrypted binarization metadata back to the service provider, together with a signature over these data and the username. With this signature, the device proves knowledge of the secret key corresponding to the public key. e signature also e ectively ties the entire protocol transcript together, ensuring matching conversations between device and service provider.
e salt being a unique identi er, is also used as session identi er for the service provider to link the messages.
Authentication protocol
e veri cation protocol is illustrated in Fig. 3 and involves the following:
• e device asks the user to provide his or her username for the service provider and in a second phase a fresh biometric sample together with a second authentication factor. In case of a possession-based second authentication factor, the user is only asked for a biometric sample.
• e service provider supplies the device with the salt, encrypted binarization metadata for the given username. Additionally the service provider also supplies a challenge to the device to ensure freshness of the authentication.
• e device reconstructs the message that was chosen at random during the enrollment protocol from the received inputs. anks to the error correcting code, one can decode errors due to the biometric sample being slightly di erent from the ones supplied during the enrollment protocol.
Verify OK Verify OK Figure 3 : Two-factor user authentication protocol.
From the decoded message the signing key is derived as in the enrollment protocol.
• e device signs the service provider's challenge and sends the signature back to the service provider. Again the salt is used as a session identi er.
• If the signature veri es with the stored public key, the user is authenticated.
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
We show that the proposed scheme is secure and privacy-preserving. e security and privacy analysis are performed for the worst case, i.e. assuming a knowledge-based second authentication factor with min-entropy << λ. When using a possession-based second authentication factor, = λ. 
Security

(S )
. e proposed user authentication scheme is a secure two-factor authentication scheme in the security parameter according to De nition 2.2, assuming a secure KDF, IND-CPA-secure encryption scheme and an universal unforgeable signature scheme.
P
. e adversary A is given a complete copy of the server's database and one authentication factor of the user it tries to impersonate. e proof consists of two cases: in the rst A is given the user's password pwd while in the second it is given the user's biometric feature vector Q . e adversary succeeds in impersonating a user if it can produce a valid signature on a given challenge. Without knowledge of the user's signing key sk, this implies A breaking universal unforgeability of the signature scheme of which the probability of success is negl(λ). We will now show for both cases, that the adversary cannot recover the message m and hence not sk. m can be recovered using the binarization metadata BM i and a valid biometric data Q by means of the function and the error-correction code.
• Case 1: Given the user's password pwd, A can decrypt EBM to obtain the binarization metadata BM. However, without knowledge on the biometric data Q , A's probability to recover c, and hence m, is negl(λ).
• Case 2: Given the user's biometric data Q , A needs BM to recover m. Without knowledge of the secret key K, this implies A breaking IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme of which the probability of success is negl(λ). e KDF is secure with respect to the source min-entropy, being . Hence A's probability of success of recovering K, hence BM and m, is negl( ).
Privacy
T 5.2. e proposed user authentication scheme is privacypreserving in the security parameter according to De nition 2.3, assuming a secure KDF and IND-CPA-secure encryption scheme.
P . e proof is based on a series of hybrid games.
• Game 0 : is is the original privacy game Exp Priv Π, A ( ). Let X 0 be the event that b = b in this game.
• Game 1 : is is the same as Game 0 , except that now the symmetric encryption key generated from KDF(pwd, s b ) is replaced by a uniformly distributed random key of equal length. Let X 1 be the event that b = b in this game.
• Game 2 : is is the same as Game 1 , except that the secret signing key generated from KDF(m, s b ) is replaced by a uniformly distributed random key of equal length. Let X 2 be the event that b = b in this game.
Claim 1: | Pr{X 0 } − Pr{X 1 }| is negl( ). Proof: (by reduction) An adversary A with an advantage ϵ > negl( ), can be used to construct another adversary B against the security of the KDF with advantage ϵ for the source's min-entropy of , which contradicts the de nition of a secure KDF.
Claim 2: | Pr{X 1 } − Pr{X 2 }| is negl(λ). Proof Similar to the proof of claim 1. Claim 3: |2 Pr{X 2 } − 1| is negl( ). Proof In Game 2 , both the symmetric encryption key and the signing key are replaced by uniformly random keys. erefore, the claim follows from the assumption that the symmetric encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure (in the security parameter λ).
Unlinkability and Irreversibility
In our protocol, we achieve unlinkability by uncoupling the biometrics from its binary representation (cf. Sect. 4 for details). So if the binary representation is somehow compromised, then the user can just revoke it and re-enroll, knowing that a new random binary representation will be generated. A compromised binary representation cannot be linked to a user biometrics. Regarding linkability due to the disclosure of the stored metadata, this is avoided by encrypting it using a second authentication factor.
Regarding irreversibility, the binarization metadata provides some information about the original biometric features in the case that this metadata is designed to increase the reliability of the binary features. e binary representation is not present in the stored metadata, impeding the recovering of the original biometric features. As our protocol protects both the binarization metadata and the binary biometric representation, no information is disclosed about the original biometric template to the considered adversaries.
CONCLUSIONS
We presented a method for decoupling biometrics from their protected binary representation. e usefulness of this construction for biometric template protection is demonstrated by incorporating it in a multi-factor authentication protocol in a remote scenario, based on an inherent factor (biometric) combined with either a possession factor (token stored on the smart phone) or a knowledge factor (password inpu ed by user).
e proposed protocol uses the decoupling primitives for providing unlinkability to biometrics and relies on a minimum of two authentication factors to provide resistance against malicious adversaries both regarding security and privacy.
e proposed solution provides irreversibility and unlinkability of the biometric template. Comprehensive security and privacy analysis demonstrate the e ectiveness and robustness of the design.
